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over any subject, at once become possessed of the power [to punish for
contempt].""

The court made it clear that this power was given

because of necessity."
In State v. Estill the majority apparently felt that the power to punish perjury as a contempt was essential to the effective operation of the
court. If this is true,28 then in creating the court our constitutional
forefathers must have granted this power.29 A statute denying
it,
0
passed before or after the constitution, would be repugnant to it.
However, contrary to Judge Mallery's contention, RCW 7.20.010 is
not rendered a nullity because of the Estill decision. It still remains
in force in enumeration of particular acts which may not be within the
court's inherent power to punish, or which the court might not wish to
punish on its own accord."'
The Washington practitioner should not be misled by the rather
loose language appearing in this decision which in places indicates a
radical departure from established law. The court has merely denied
the power of the legislature to deprive it of inherent powers necessary
to its effective operation. It is suggested that the acts enumerated by
statute remain as a substantial part of the Washington law of contempt.32
CHAIRLES F. ABBOTT JR.
JURISDICTION
State Jurisdiction over Indian Country. Two recent Washington
cases, State ex rel. Starlund v. Superior Court' and State ex rel. Adams
26 Michaelson v. United States exr. rel. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42,
65-66 (1924).
27 Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 425, 63 P.2d 397, 409
(1936).
28 Only the court can make this decision. See State v. Frew, 24 WVa. 416, 49 Am.
Rep. 257, 274 (1884).
29 The majority quoted from Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash.
396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936). "But the courts are not required to recognize a legislative
restriction which has the effect of depriving them of a constitutional grant or of one
of their inherent powers. What the legislature has not given, it cannot take away ......
State v. Estill, 55 Wn.2d 576, 580, 349 P.2d 210, 212 (1960).
20 Hence Judge Mallery's citation of art. XXVII, § 2, of the state constitution,
which provides that "All laws now in force in the Territory of Washington, which are
not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force . . ." (Emphasis added.) does
not contradict, but supports, the majority's decision.
31 See 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 43(b) (1939).
22 Apparently Keller v. Keller, 52 Wn.2d 84, 86, 323 P.2d 231, 232 (1958)
is a still
valid statement of the Washington position. "In general, contempt proceedings in
this jurisdiction may be placed in three categories: (a) criminal contempt prosecuted
under RCW 9.23.010; (b) civil contempt initiated under RCW 7.20.010 et seq; and
(c) contempt proceedings resulting from the long exercised power of constitutional
courts (1) to punish summarily contemptuous conduct occurring in the presence of
the court, (2) to enforce orders or judgments in aid of the court's jurisdiction, and
(3) to punish violations of orders or judgments."
1 157 Wash. Dec. 87, 356 P.2d 994 (1960).
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v. Superior Court,2 point up the hiatus which continues to exist in the
State of Washington's jurisdiction over Indians living within its borders. In the Starlund case Clyde Colwash, an unemancipated, enrolled
member of the Yakima Indian Tribe, who resided upon the Yakima
Indian Reservation, had been abandoned by his parents. The Yakima
County Juvenile Court declared him to be a dependent child and
placed him in the custody of the juvenile probation officer. In the
Adams case Indian parents were deprived of custody of their four children in a juvenile proceeding in Okanogan County. The children were
enrolled members of the Colville Indian Tribe and had lived on the
Colville Indian Reservation. In both cases the dependency orders were
reviewed by the Washington Supreme Court on writs of certiorari and
the respective juvenile courts were held to be without jurisdiction over
the children.
Public Law 280' enabled the State of Washington to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians and Indian Lands within the
state, either by amending the state constitution or by enacting affirmative legislation.' In response to Public Law 280, the Washington Legislature in 1957 enacted H.B. 404,5 now codified as RCW 37.12, which
obligates the state to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian
Tribes whose tribal councils have made requests to the governor that
such jurisdiction be exercised. To date only nine of Washington's
twenty-one Indian Tribes have requested that the state assume jurisdiction over them.'
In the Adams case the court pointed out that:
The confederated tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation have not
elected to place themselves under the operation of RCW 37.12; until
they do so, or the legislature unconditionally assumes jurisdiction, as
2 157 Wash. Dec. 73, 356 P2d 985 (1960).

367 Stat. 588, 590 (1953), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (note) (1958). While this section of
the statute does not refer to the states to which it applies by name, the states to which
§ 6 of the statute applies are: Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah and Washington. H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1953).
4 "The consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to
amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may
be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction
in accordance with the provisions of this Act...." 67 Stat. 590 (1953), 28 U.S.C. §
1360 (note) (1958). The Washington Supreme Court has held that an act of the legislature was sufficient for the assumption of jurisdiction by the Washington courts. State
v. Paul, 53 Wn.2d 789, 337 P.2d 33 (1959).
5 Wash. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 240; now codified in RCW 37.12.
6 Letter from Warren A. Bishop, Assistant to the Governor, to the author, April 17,
1961.
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authorized by Public Law 280, the courts of this state7 will have no
jurisdiction beyond that expressly granted by Congress.
In the Starlund case, RCW 37.12 is not mentioned specifically but the
court proceeded on the assumption that it did not confer jurisdiction
over members of the Yakima Tribe upon the juvenile court. The court
again stated that the juvenile court could have only such jurisdiction
as has been expressly surrendered by Congress.
A primary consideration which motivated Congress in the enactment of Public Law 280 was the hiatus in criminal law enforcement
authority which existed with respect to Indians in the states involved.8
The states lacked criminal jurisdiction over Indians within their borders. Federal jurisdiction over crimes by one Indian against another
was limited except for ten major crimes.9 Consequently, as a practical
matter enforcement of any type of criminal law was left to the tribes
themselves. In most states the tribal organization was not adequate
to perform this function. The assumption of criminal law jurisdiction by the states was looked to as a means of restoring law and order
to the Indian Tribes.
In the area of civil litigation too, the tribal council was found to be
ill-fitted to cope with the exigencies of twentieth century life. Increased
contact with the outside world had accultured residents of Indian
Country to American ways to a point where an extension of civil jurisdiction by the states was deemed desirable.
In passing Public Law 280 Congress proceeded with two considerations in mind: (1) the wishes of the states involved; and (2) the
wishes of the Indian Tribes to be affected. According to the report
of the Secretary of the Interior, state and local officials in California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin were favorably disposed
to the assumption of jurisdiction. Civil and criminal jurisdiction over
Indian Tribes was conferred upon these states directly,"0 both because
of the states' willingness to assume it and because there were no state
constitutional or statutory impediments to the assumption of jurisdiction by the states. Of the Indian Tribes to be affected by the proposed transfer of jurisdiction, only the Red Lake Band of Chippewas
in Minnesota, the Warm Springs Tribe in Oregon and the Menominee
7157

Wash. Dec. 73, 77, 456 P.2d 985, 988 (1960).

8 H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953).

9 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1958). The "Ten Major Crimes" are murder, manslaughter,
rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery and larceny.
1067 Stat. 588 (1953), 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1958), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1958).
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Tribe in Wisconsin voiced objections. All three of the tribes were
exempted from the transfer.
Public Law 280 enabled the State of Nevada to assume criminal
and civil jurisdiction over the Indians within its borders at such time
as it should desire to do so by affirmative legislation.11 No state constitutional or statutory provision stood to impair a direct conferral of
jurisdiction upon the state but Nevada authorities had expressed a
general unwillingness to assume jurisdiction. A number of Nevada
county officials were willing to undertake criminal law enforcement
only if granted a subsidy for doing so. Other officials were unwilling
to undertake criminal law enforcement under any circumstances.
Of the states enabled to assume jurisdiction by constitutional amendment or affirmative legislation, only two voiced objection to the assumption of jurisdiction. State officials in Montana and North Dakota
appeared unwilling to undertake criminal law enforcement without a
federal subsidy for doing so. Officials of the State of Washington
voiced no objection to the assumption of jurisdiction. The Indian
Tribes located in Montana and North Dakota objected to the assumption of jurisdiction by the respective states. Within the State of Washington the Colville and Yakima Tribes objected to the assumption of
jurisdiction over them by the state because of a feeling that their members would be treated inequitably in the state's courts. The Secretary
of the Interior in his report stated that the Colville and Yakima Tribes
had "reasonably satisfactory" tribal organizations.12 It is interesting
to note, however, that the Adams and the Starlund cases arose out of
the Colville and the Yakima Tribes respectively.
The State of Washington does not stand alone in its failure to fully
utilize the benefits accorded by Public Law 280. Few of the states
affected by Public Law 280 have actively responded to it at all. A
Nevada statute enacted in 1955"3 provides for the assumption of jurisdiction by the state over Indian Tribes within the state; however,
it allows the county commissioners of each county to except their
counties from its operation by petitioning the governor. The North
Dakota Constitution has been amended14 only to allow for the assumption of jurisdiction in the future by an affirmative act of the legislature. A South Dakota statute 15 permits the exercise of jurisdiction in
1167 Stat. 590 (1953), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (note) (1958).
12 H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1953).
1
N v. REv. STAT. 41.430, 194.040.
"4N.D. CONST. § 203.
Is S.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 319.
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counties where two conditions have been met. The Indian Tribes to
be affected must have assented by a vote of a majority of the tribe
and the county commissioners must have successfully negotiated a
contract with the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs for the reimbursement of expenses occasioned by the exercise of jurisdiction. Since the
Bureau of Indian Affairs has not been authorized to contract with the
states, the statute has been without effect.
In most states the main objections to the assumption of jurisdiction
over Indians are the increased costs necessitated by its exercise and
the antipathy of certain of the Indian Tribes affected. A fuller exercise of jurisdiction by the State of Washington does not seem to be
objectionable from the standpoint of costs. This is apparent from the
fact that RCW 37.12 in its present form does not make the exercise
of jurisdiction dependent upon the receipt of a subsidy or the wishes
of the localities involved. The exercise of jurisdiction depends entirely upon the wishes of the Indian Tribes to be affected.
Public Law 280, which was based on information supplied by the
Secretary of the Interior, 6 is representative of the efforts of Congress
to legislate in the best interests of the Indians and the states affected.
An evaluation of RCW 37.12 in terms of the considerations which gave
rise to the enactment of Public Law 280 indicates that neither the
State of Washington nor the Indians living within its borders are fully
realizing the benefits offered by Congress. The Starlund and Adams
cases demonstrate that the Washington statute, an act which the
legislature deemed "necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health, and safety, and for the support of the state
government and its existing public institutions . . .,,,.has been largely
ineffective. The failure of a majority of the Indian Tribes to petition
for the assumption of jurisdiction by the state has hampered enforcement of the state's criminal laws."8 It has also precluded a number of
individual Indians from availing themselves of the protection of the
state's civil laws.
The Secretary of the Interior stated in his report to the House
Committee,"9 that with the exception of the Yakima and Colville
Tribes, the Indians in Washington generally concurred in the proposal
to confer jurisdiction upon the states. The failure of a number of the
tribes to petition the governor for the exercise of state jurisdiction
16 H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1953).
'7 Wash. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 240, § 8.
18 See Comment JurisdictionOver Indians,33 WASH. L. REv. 289 (1958).
19 H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1953).
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over them seems to stem more from tribal inertia than from hostility
to state jurisdiction. Until the legislature acts affirmatively to assert
jurisdiction over the Indian Tribes, situations such as those presented
in the Adams and Starlund cases will continue to arise in Washington.
A large number of Indians will continue to be without the protection
of the state's courts.
LEON MISTEREK
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Suspension or Revocation of a Driver's License by Police Courts.
The Washington Supreme Court recently announced that no police or
municipal court may suspend a Washington State driver's license for
violation of a municipal ordinance.
In City of Bellingham v. Schampera,1 defendant Schampera was
charged and convicted in the Bellingham police court of driving while
under the influence of intoxicants in violation of a city ordinance substantially similar3 to RCW 46.56.010. He appealed to the Whatcom
County Superior Court where a trial de novo was had. He was convicted, fined $100 and sentenced to ninety days in the county jail. His
driver's license was suspended for 6 months.
On appeal, Schampera argued that the state, by enacting RCW
46.56.010, had pre-empted the field of legislation with respect to
drunken driving; that a municipality was without power to suspend
or revoke a state driver's license for violation of a municipal ordinance;
and that the Bellingham ordinance was invalid because the punishment
provided thereunder was in excess of that allowed by law to be assessed
by a municipal or police court. The court held against Schampera's
first and third contentions but for him on the second.
With respect to the third contention, the Bellingham city ordinance
provided:
Upon the first conviction for the violation of the provisions of this
section [one of which prohibits driving on the public highways while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor] the court shall impose a fine
of not less than fifty dollars or more than five hundred dollars and not
less than five days or more than one year in jail, and shall in addition
1 157 Wash. Dec. 1, 356 P.2d 292 (1960).
2 BFLLINGUAM, WASH., CODE § 18.56.100

8

(1955).

The ordinance forbade drunken driving and was, in its penalty provisions, a
verbatim copy of RCW 46.56.010.
4
"Though the appeal results in a trial de novo, the charge is still the violation of a
municipal ordinance, and the superior court's authority is specifically limited on such
an appeal by RCW 35.22.560... [$300 fine and/or ninety days imprisonment]." City

of Bellingham v. Schampera, 157 Wash. Dec. 1, 11, 356 Pl2d 292, 299 (1960).

